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Abstract 
 
SmartCells developed a technology that would re-engineer the existing 
pharmaceutical, insulin, to perform in a way that was safer and more efficacious than the 
original underlying drug (Zion, 2004).  This novel approach to delivering insulin was in 
the late pre-clinical phase of development when the pharmaceutical giant, Merck & Co., 
acquired SmartCells and its technology in late-2010 (Carroll, 2010).  The deal garnered 
national awareness for being one of the largest pre-clinical life-science deals in history 
(Booth, 2011).  Even with this much attention, to date no one has critically analyzed the 
key factors nor the inner mechanics of SmartCells’ unique ability to achieve such an 
outcome.  This case study will delve into not only the critical external factors but also the 
internal events and decisions made by the company and its key management team 
members leading up to the Merck acquisition.  Using publicly available technical papers, 
patents and published articles as well as interviews with former high-level SmartCells 
team members, this case study will determine the general applicability and potential for 
deploying the “SmartCells Business Model” to enhance the rate of success of early-stage 
pharmaceutical ventures. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
On December 2, 2010, the Wall Street Journal announced that Merck and Co. had 
agreed to acquire a relatively unknown start-up pharmaceutical company, SmartCells, 
Inc., located in Beverly, Massachusetts, for over $500M in upfront and milestone 
payments (Rockoff, 2010).  The acquisition amount, large by any standard, was 
impressive given that SmartCells had relied solely on a modest sum of angel investments 
and grant funds, never raised a dollar of institutional venture capital (VC) money and had 
yet to run a single clinical trial with its technology (McBride, 2010).  Similar pre-clinical 
deals in the pharmaceutical industry between 2005 and 2012 that consisted of upfront and 
milestone payments tended to lie within the $400M and $600M range (Giniatullina, 
Boorsman, Mulder, & van Deventer, 2013).  However, pre-clinical biotechnology deals 
between 2006 and 2010 had very low upfront amounts that were between $8M and $12M 
(Thau & Delcheva, 2012).  According to at least one source, the upfront amount for the 
SmartCells acquisition exceeded $80M and interviews with former SmartCells team 
members indicate the upfront amount exceeded nine figures (Booth, 2011).  Furthermore, 
most of the $400M and $600M range deals involved the acquisition of VC-backed 
companies that likely raised significantly more capital than SmartCells thereby 
diminishing the investment return value for these deals.  
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The upfront and total return on investment (ROI) put SmartCells at or near the top 
of the list of successful life-science angel investments and spawned phrases such as the 
“SmartCells model” for aspiring entrepreneurs to adopt in the wake of the SmartCells 
success (Booth, 2011).  In modern day start-up ventures throughout the industry, the 
“SmartCells model” has become what is ubiquitously known as a capital efficient 
company, relying aggressively on non-dilutive financing and angel investors with nearly 
rigorous aversion to institutional and/or VC financing.  Importantly, up until the time of 
the SmartCells acquisition, no pharmaceutical start-up company had demonstrated that 
one could build an asset that could not only survive but actually achieve a successful exit 
with so little financing from non-institutional, individual investors.  Since then, 
entrepreneurs have paid much attention to the SmartCells’ capital efficient model as a 
potential way to build companies, especially given the increasingly scarce sources of 
private capital available to nascent life-science ventures.   
The focus of this case study, therefore, is to analyze the key elements that 
contributed to SmartCells’ success and determine which elements can be generalized and 
which are specific to SmartCells’ unique circumstances.  These key success elements can 
be divided into two major categories: business planning and navigating the technical 
development.  The two categories, however, are symbiotic and therefore not completely 
separable e.g. as technical issues arose, business decisions were made to support such 
paths and vice-versa.  Technical issues include the specific risks associated with the 
composition of the underlying technology, manufacturing-related issues, and the safety 
and efficacy work required to mitigate those risks.  These technical risks are coupled with 
financing and liquidity risks on the business side e.g. deciding which critical efforts 
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required the most support with limited resources and striking a balance between 
minimizing company expenditures while still making progress.   
As may be expected from any high-technology start-up venture, the process from 
2004-2010 was anything but linear.  SmartCells was a life-science venture built from the 
ground up with a patent-pending technology, licensed to the company from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.), with three co-founders who put together 
a plan with the help of early prospective investors to step down incremental risk and 
build value.  With the perspective that value is an inverse function of risk, the founders 
decided that above all the key to success was a capital-efficient, lean operating model 
where each and every day was spent reducing risk (SmartCells, 2016).  This may seem 
like an obvious approach to building successful ventures, but until that time there was a 
widely-held belief that the capital requirements for pharmaceutical ventures were so high 
that raising and deploying large amounts of funds from VC firms was absolutely 
necessary.  Capital efficient, incremental risk reduction for biotech ventures seemed 
contrary to conventional wisdom.    
At the heart of this analysis lies a central question: was SmartCells a once-in-a-
lifetime outlier that benefited from a non-repeatable confluence of key elements, or can 
future enterprises generally apply the core elements of the SmartCells’ strategy to 
improve their chances of success and increase shareholder returns?  
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Chapter II 
Materials and Methods 
 
This case study is based on publicly available reports, press-releases, technical 
disclosures, such as the doctoral thesis of Dr. Todd C. Zion (SmartCells co-founder), 
patents awarded to SmartCells, and interviews with industry veterans.  Most notable and 
unique to this thesis are the personal interviews with SmartCells team members who 
provided their perspectives on the key business, technical, and human capital elements 
that contributed to SmartCells’ success.  
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Chapter III 
Results 
 
SmartCells was co-founded on August 15, 2003 by Todd C. Zion, Ph.D., the 
Company’s President and CEO, and Jackie Y. Ying, Ph.D., Dr. Zion’s Ph.D. thesis 
advisor at M.I.T. where he developed the underlying technology that formed the basis for 
the company (Mervis, 2015).  Dr. Zion also included several business school students as 
nominal co-founders in recognition of their helping Dr. Zion and SmartCells win the 
Robert P. Goldberg Grand Prize in the 2003 M.I.T. $50K Entrepreneurship Competition 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003).  Shortly after the company’s founding, 
Dr. Zion recruited two key members of the SmartCells management team, Dr. Thomas 
Lancaster and Mr. James Herriman, who would become integral co-founders and 
management team members through the Merck acquisition (Matheson, 2013).   
 SmartInsulin was a technology that aimed to make an existing, proven 
pharmaceutical work more safely and effectively than the original formulation.  
However, as described in more detail in the Technical section, the enabling technical 
innovation required chemical modification of the underlying insulin molecule.  The 
change in chemistry of the underlying drug necessitated a full Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) New Drug Application (NDA) regulatory approval process, which 
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meant that SmartInsulin was on a minimum ten to fifteen year product development 
timeline with a total cost expected to exceed $1B (Van Norman, 2016).  In addition, 
further innovation was required to address the known safety, efficacy and manufacturing 
risks of the technology licensed from M.I.T. before it could enter the regulatory process.  
Therefore, it was clear that at some point along the product development trajectory, 
SmartCells would need to partner with a well-capitalized and experienced pharmaceutical 
company to bring their product to market.  The question at hand was which financing and 
operating model best addressed the capital and technical development risk profile. 
 
Business 
 
After winning the M.I.T. $50K Entrepreneurship Competition, SmartCells began 
to further develop their business model.  The initial idea, as with most start-ups, was to 
raise large sums of money from VCs.  However, this did not appear to be the best or the 
most desirable initial path for SmartCells (SmartCells, 2016).  VCs in 2003-2004 had 
large amounts of capital but were moving away from high-risk, early-stage investments 
such as SmartCells, because they had overinvested during the “dot com” bubble and 
failed to see bright prospects for high valued initial public offerings (IPOs) (Pan, 2005).  
Furthermore, the VC investment thesis involved deploying tens of millions of dollars at 
the outset rather than the “modest dollars required for SmartCells to step down risk 
incrementally” (SmartCells, 2016).  Put simply, most VCs wanted to invest large 
amounts of capital in less risky ventures but had no desire to invest comparatively smaller 
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amounts of capital to “de-risk” assets and make them more attractive for future 
investment: an obvious conundrum for ventures like SmartCells (SmartCells, 2016).    
SmartCells spent the remainder of 2003 and most of 2004, while Dr. Zion was 
completing his Ph.D. thesis, developing a business model that could overcome the 
barriers of traditional VC financing.  The team first developed their plan with the help of 
the M.I.T. Venture Mentoring Service (VMS), an organization comprising experienced 
technical entrepreneurs who assist aspiring entrepreneurs from the M.I.T. community 
(students, staff, faculty and alumni) in starting a business (MIT Venture Mentoring 
Service, 2015).    
The co-founders gained access to major pharmaceutical companies through 
M.I.T.’s Industrial Liaison Program (ILP) and the pharmaceutical companies’ own 
scouting efforts in response to the publicity from the M.I.T. Entrepreneurship 
Competition.  Through the early meetings with the pharmaceutical companies, 
SmartCells learned that pharmaceutical companies would not invest in SmartCells’ 
technology, no matter the potential, at such an early stage of product development.  
Particularly, pharmaceutical companies that had experience with insulin development 
would not invest until they saw a certain amount of additional risk reduction (e.g. safety 
assessment, manufacturability analysis, additional data from animal studies, etc.).   
Given the pharmaceutical company interest in SmartCells’ technology and an 
early sense of the critical commercial risks, SmartCells attempted to develop a business 
plan that would fund the company sufficiently to address these risks and enable a high 
value pharmaceutical partnership.  To that end, SmartCells decided to target angel 
investors to fund their company, and with the help of VMS, they found a number of 
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interested lead investors.  The angel investors were drawn to SmartCells’ high-risk, high-
reward business strategy which allowed SmartCells to focus on a single product and 
address the key pre-clinical and early clinical technical risks in order to seek a potential 
partner as soon as possible.   
 
Exit Strategy 
With a relatively clear view of the exit, SmartCells worked backwards to develop 
a financing and operating plan that would enable significant returns on investment for the 
financial investors as well as the founders and employees (SmartCells, 2016).  The team 
leveraged its discussions with VMS, pharmaceutical companies, early investors, and 
scientific medical advisors to delineate specific value-creating milestones. The crux of 
the plan (described in more detail in the Technical section) rested on the belief that, due 
to the nature of its glucose-responsive insulin construct, the company needed to 
demonstrate acute safety and performance in humans before obtaining a high value 
pharmaceutical partnership.  Insulin activity and glucose-responsiveness can be readily 
assessed in animals and patients using standard protocols over the course of weeks, not 
years (Hovelmann, 2015).  In addition, there is a more reliable correlation between 
insulin activity between humans and animal models than exists for most other 
pharmaceutical agents and disease areas (Al-awar et al., 2016; King, 2012).  Furthermore, 
if a clinical study was required, SmartCells’ first human clinical study would be able to 
determine the dose-dependent insulin activity as a function of patient blood sugar levels – 
the core benefit of the underlying technology - with relatively few patients over a short 
period of time (SmartCells, 2016).  Therefore, the SmartCells team decided to raise 
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enough money to develop the best formulation, establish the product safety and efficacy 
in animals, and, if necessary, perform a clinical study to show glucose-responsive 
glycemic control in humans, while seeking opportunities to partner the project along the 
way (SmartCells, 2016).  SmartCells’ operations were therefore entirely focused on the 
pre-clinical and early-stage clinical development of SmartInsulin. 
 
Mission Statement 
SmartCells set forth the company’s mission to become the first to deliver a self-
regulating insulin injection for the treatment of diabetes.  Diabetes continues to be a 
global pandemic, affecting over 415 million people worldwide according to the 
International Diabetes Federation, consuming an estimated 12% of global healthcare in 
2015 (International Diabetes Federation, 2017).  The American Diabetes Association 
estimated that in 2012 over twenty-nine million Americans suffered from diabetes 
(American Diabetes Association, 2017).  Conventional insulin is rarely capable of 
normalizing patient blood sugar levels mainly due to its inherent risk of inducing life-
threatening hypoglycemia if dosed inappropriately (Cryer, 2008).  Inadequate blood sugar 
control then leads to the costly, debilitating sequelae of diabetes which include nerve 
damage, blindness, kidney disease, and cardiovascular disease (American Diabetes 
Association, 2002).  SmartCells’ aimed to address this unmet need by building the ability 
to sense and respond to blood sugar directly into the insulin formulation thereby allowing 
it to turn itself on when needed and off again when blood sugar levels normalized.  If 
successful, SmartCells’ technology would help increase patients’ quality of life, enable 
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physicians to safely treat diabetes more aggressively, and increased third-party payers’ 
annual savings from a reduction in their clients’ healthcare costs (SmartCells, 2016). 
To accomplish their mission, SmartCells needed to complete Investigational New 
Drug (IND)-enabling pre-clinical safety and efficacy studies using SmartInsulin and 
develop good manufacturing practices (GMP) to produce compliant SmartInsulin 
materials.  Accomplishing these milestones would allow SmartCells to submit an IND 
application to the FDA for SmartInsulin to complete human proof-of-principle (Phase I 
clinical trials) (Van Norman, 2016).  They could then establish a strategic partnership 
with a pharmaceutical company to support Phase II/III trials and regulatory clearance to 
introduce SmartInsulin for commercial use. 
 
Operations 
SmartCells’ headquarters and operations were based in sub-leased space from 
Inotek Pharmaceuticals Corporation in suburban Beverly, Massachusetts (Frechette, 
2013).  The shared space provided laboratory equipment and an animal facility.  Any 
additional essential equipment needed for a specific operation which was not available 
through the shared space agreement with Inotek was purchased in a previously owned or 
refurbished state (SmartCells, 2016).  The in-house equipment allowed SmartCells to 
efficiently synthesize variants of the chemical entities that make up SmartInsulin and 
subject them to a broad range of specialized analytic tests.  Eventually, Inotek outgrew 
the premises and had to sell off their equipment while SmartCells was in a position to 
grow.  SmartCells assumed Inotek’s lease at a significant reduction for 20,000 square feet 
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of lab and office space and was able to buy all of their equipment and animal facility 
resources for pennies on the dollar (SmartCells, 2016). 
SmartCells was able to develop their own good laboratory practice (GLP) space 
with the newly acquired facilities.  The expanded animal facility allowed for the housing 
and testing of a significantly larger numbers of rodents that were needed to conduct the 
requisite studies.  The animal studies included the ability to induce, treat and monitor a 
large numbers of streptozotocin (STZ)-diabetic rats over long periods of time.  
Hyperglycemic clamp tests were performed on normal and STZ-diabetic rats for periods 
of up to twelve hours.  Additionally, multi-day tests of insulin formulations were 
conducted while using continuous glucose monitors to record the results over the duration 
of the tests (SmartCells, 2016).  
The additional space enabled the in-house production of GMP-material and 
support of out-sourced safety and efficacy testing of new insulin formulations by contract 
research organizations (CROs) on various animal models including normal and diabetic 
rats and pigs as well as dogs and cats.  Furthermore, SmartCells utilized its own resources 
in conjunction with outside contractors to validate analytical and functional assays for use 
in manufacturing SmartInsulin materials.  The choice of sharing space with Inotek proved 
to be one of the best decisions SmartCells made (SmartCells, 2016),  allowing the 
company to deploy minimal amounts of cash to accomplish their goals even as the 
company prepared for clinical trials.   
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Financing 
 
Angel Investment vs. Traditional Venture Capital 
As described above, SmartCells was forced to look for alternative sources of 
financing as life-science VCs were moving away from “seed” financing of high risk, 
early-stage ventures.  However, the team sought alternative financing for other, more 
practical reasons.  Specifically, several VC partners who were interested in investing in 
SmartCells personally advised the founding team to avoid VC funding so that the team 
could retain significant control over the company and its direction, thereby participating 
in a greater portion of the upside (SmartCells, 2016).  The belief was that a small, 
ambitious, creative and nimble team with the right kind of downstream incentives would 
be a better recipe for success than an imported VC team of management and board of 
directors without much “skin in the game” (SmartCells, 2016). 
The SmartCells team, therefore, looked to angel investors for equity financing.  
Angel investors in 2003-2004 had been very active in information technology (IT), web-
based, and device-oriented start-ups, but had comparatively little experience with 
pharmaceutical ventures (Balakrishnan, 2015; Partners in BioPharma Consulting, 2014; 
SmartCells, 2016).  Furthermore, they had only limited amounts of capital available and 
were justifiably concerned that the company would eventually need more capital than 
they could provide, leading to a VC round which would inevitably overwhelm their 
interests in the company through dilution and preemptive rights.  The significant financial 
resources needed to overcome the large technical and regulatory hurdles were virtually 
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the same whether SmartCells chose to pursue angel or VC investments.  Therefore, the 
company had to develop an operating and financing plan that relied not only on angel 
financing and “sweat equity” from the founding management team, but also significant 
funding from non-dilutive government grant and charitable resources (SmartCells, 2016). 
The three financial pillars of angel financing, non-dilutive financing, and upside 
incentives for the team’s hard work, had to be established and maintained such that the 
company’s future success was dependent on each aspect.    
 
Angel Funding 
 Raising $10M from angel investors was a key part of SmartCells success.  Most 
of the money came in relatively small amounts, $25K to $50K, which necessitated a large 
investor base (SmartCells, 2016).  In fact, SmartCells had around 150 individual 
investors by the time the company was sold (Booth, 2011).  This created tremendous 
pressure on investor relations for an already small and taxed management team.  
However, the SmartCells team recognized this trade-off, and developed a plan through 
which board members and observers frequently communicated critical information to 
their constituents and distilled their responses to provide clear feedback to the SmartCells 
management team (SmartCells, 2016).  After all, the terms on which the investors put up 
their money left a good upside to management if they were successful.  These favorable 
terms incentivized SmartCells to be the best possible stewards of their investors’ money, 
so that their rewards and the investors’ rewards were well aligned.  Example terms that 
were more favorable than typical VC terms included but were not limited to: minimally 
intrusive board representation, simple weighted-average anti-dilution, few restrictions on 
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future “up round” financing events, limited liquidation preference, higher valuations, and 
reasonable but not overly taxing information rights (SmartCells, 2016). 
Despite the upside associated with angel investors, in general they can be more 
difficult than VCs due to their high expectations for very quick exits (less than three 
years) (SmartCells, 2016).  When in reality, life-science startups require four to seven 
years to even select a drug candidate (see Figure 1).  Additionally, angel investors, unlike 
their VC counterparts, may not have as “deep of pockets” so that if additional financing 
were needed, or if the next round of capital requirements were too large, the current angel 
investors would not have the means to help (SmartCells, 2016).  The pros and cons 
associated with angel funding versus VC funding, compiled and organized from 
interviews with SmartCells team members and a review of the financing market, are 
presented in Table 1.  Many of the investors in Series A, see Figure 1, continued to invest 
their pro rata shares throughout the company’s history; in some cases, the investors 
invested considerably more than their pro ratas in Series B, C, and D.  That type of strong 
support was important for SmartCells.  The angel investors believed in and trusted the 
management team, especially the CEO, to make good decisions on their behalf 
(SmartCells, 2016).  However, as shown in Figure 2, SmartCells had to raise, in its last 
year, almost as much as it had raised in the previous five years to support the early stage 
clinical studies.  The company had reached the limit of its ability to fund operations using 
its lean, capital-efficient model.  
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Figure 1. Typical new drug development approval process data from the FDA. Out-of-
pocket cost significantly increase as clinical phrases progress.  Additionally, SmartCells 
had less than a 1% chance of success (Huckman & Strick, 2010). 
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Table 1: Entrepreneurs’ Perspective on Angel Funding vs. Venture Capital.  The table 
represents the generally accept pros and cons of angel funding vs. VC funding from an 
entrepreneur’s perspective.       
 Pro Con 
Angel 
Funding 
 
 Exit in 3-5 years 
 Exit with less than $5-10M 
invested capital 
 Potential for 10x return 
 Easily understood story 
 Group has personal 
connection to CEO 
 Financial investment from 
management team 
 Accepts relatively high 
pre-money valuations 
 Less governance and 
oversight  
 Vast network of high net 
worth individuals 
 Less capital available 
 Time consuming 
 No safety net for founders and 
management team 
 Looking for exits around 
every corner 
 Less capital available 
 Time consuming 
 Less optionality if need to 
pivot 
 
Venture 
Capital 
 Large amounts of money 
 Long-time horizon 5-10 
years 
 Provides management 
experience 
 Business connections 
 Loss of control 
 Management control 
 Long and complex process 
 
 
Acquisition of Non-Dilutive Funding 
SmartCells received $30K in proceeds as the Robert P. Goldberg Grand Prize 
winner in the M.I.T. $50K Entrepreneurship Competition in May 2003.  Subsequently, 
the company received its first outside financing through the sale of equity to private 
investors in September 2004.  That month SmartCells also received notice of their first 
grant award from the National Institute of Health (NIH).  The NIH and the National 
Institute of Diabetes and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) both support the Small Business 
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Innovation Research programs (SBIR) which is a U.S. congress mandated program that 
helps fund small businesses to reach their commercialization aspirations (National 
Institutes of Health, 2017).  The NIH/NIDDK SBIR programs would prove a robust and 
important pipeline of non-dilutive funding for SmartCells.  A list of the NIH/NIDDK 
SBIR grants awarded to SmartCells with their issuance date and monetary allotment is 
presented in Table 2. 
SmartCells worked very closely with their program officer and key personnel at 
the NIDDK so that they knew the status of the SmartCells’ program along the way.  
SmartCells presented data to them on a regular basis in person and asked for their 
recommendations with respect to experiments and scope of Research and Development 
(R&D) activities (SmartCells, 2016). 
National Institutes of Health.  NIH grants were critical to SmartCells’ success by 
providing a key source of non-dilutive funding that allowed them to cautiously use 
investor dollars for those items not reimbursable against grants, such as legal and 
administrative items.  SmartCells’ first grant was a special funding Phase 1 SBIR for 
$500K per year for two years.  Typical Phase 1 SBIR grants awarded at that time were 
approximately $100K for one year (National Academies of Sciences & Medicine, 2015). 
The initial grant allowed SmartCells to start up the company’s operations while the 
management team was concurrently raising their first $500K of financing.  This led 
SmartCells to raise another $700K very quickly.  The two Phase 2 SBIRs ($3M each) that 
SmartCells was awarded later were critical toward covering the expensive safety and 
manufacturing work required to test a product in the clinic.  Without these grants 
awarded by the NIH, SmartCells would have had to privately raise the money from VCs, 
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suffer tremendous dilution, and lose the value of a flexible, knowledgeable management 
team.   
 
 
Figure 2. “SmartCells on one slide.”  SmartCells’ product, business development and 
sources of financing over time. 
 
Other sources of non-dilutive funding included a Research, Development and 
Commercialization Agreement, that concluded in August 2008, with the Juvenile 
Diabetes Research Foundation (JDRF) to support SmartInsulin development.  This 
partnership brought in $1.5M to support risk-reducing animal studies aimed at 
understanding the difference in product performance among various mammalian species.  
Additionally, SmartCells was awarded a U.S. Army Peer Reviewed Medical Research 
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Program (PRMRP) grant for SmartInsulin large animal (mini-pig) safety and efficacy 
studies in August 2007.  The Department of Defense grant brought in $850K. 
 
Table 2: NIH/NIDDK SBIR grants.  List of grants awarded to SmartCells from the NIH 
and NIDDK in the form of SBIR grants showing number, title, start date and amount of 
the grant.   
Number Title Start Amount 
DK69870-
01 
Glucose-responsive, Self-regulated Insulin Delivery 
Oct. 
2004 
$482,276 
Sep. 
2005 
$438,290 
DK72774-
01 
RNA-Biopolymer Nanostructures for Smart Insulin 
Delivery 
Aug. 
2005 
$195,241 
DK69870-
03 
Safety Profile Optimization of Glucose-Regulated 
Insulin Formulations 
Jul. 
2006 
$749,991 
DK077292-
01 
Multimeric RNA Aptamers for Glucose-Responsive 
Insulin Formulations 
Apr. 
2007 
$394,363 
Apr. 
2008 
$335,073 
DK079482-
01 
SmartInsulin Stability, Process Development, Assay 
Validation and GMP Manufacturing 
Aug. 
2007 
$283,515 
DK080565-
01 
SmartInsulin ADME and IND-enabling Pre-clinical 
Studies 
Mar. 
2008 
$1,116,164
DK079482-
02 
SmartInsulin Stability, Process Development, Assay 
Validation and GMP Manufacturing 
Aug. 
2008 
$1,546,698
DK079482-
03 
SmartInsulin Stability, Process Development, Assay 
Validation and GMP Manufacturing 
Aug. 
2009 
$850,859 
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Dilutive vs. Non-Dilutive Funding 
SmartCells raised about $10M in dilutive equity financing (Series A, B, C and D) 
and about $13M in non-dilutive grants.  The large contribution of grant money helped 
offset the technical risks and enabled SmartCells to raise more money at favorable 
valuations along the way.  The grants not only helped the company to hone their R&D 
plan, but they also provided a key point of scientific due diligence for their investors.  
Importantly, when SmartCells needed to scale back operations to retool the new insulin 
formulation (see Technical section), they were able to leverage grant money to sustain 
them in the meantime, thereby avoiding the need to raise money at a time when the 
company was in technical or financial trouble.  Furthermore, having grant money at the 
time of the financial crisis in 2008-2009 also allowed SmartCells to avoid having to raise 
money until after the markets recovered in 2010.  
Obtaining grants also facilitated the sale of equity.  Raising money from angel 
investors versus VCs allowed the SmartCells’ management team to focus on the 
company’s strategy without the need to defer to business models or technical decisions 
that may have been guided by a VC-backed board of directors.  In general, the equity and 
grant funding kept pace with each other (see Figure 3).  Another added benefit of 
combining the two modes of financing was that the equity financing could cover specific 
R&D activities during the time periods between each grant to offset the uncertainty in 
timing between receipt of  successive grant funds.  Quite frankly, neither vehicle alone 
was sufficient for SmartCells, but the combination was very effective. 
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Figure 3: Equity vs. non-dilutive financing over time.  The amount of capital SmartCells 
raised was relatively even between equity and non-dilutive financing throughout its 
lifespan.  The dotted blue line represents a $3M grant SmartCells had to return to the 
JDRF due to the acquisition with Merck.  This grant money would have helped fund the 
clinical trial.  
 
Equity vs. Cash Compensation for Employees and Services 
Everyone on the SmartCells founding management team valued their equity more 
than cash compensation, which served as a strong motivating force (SmartCells, 2016). 
The team paid themselves as much as was necessary to ease the burdens of home life so 
that they were minimally distracted at work.  Having just enough funding to execute on 
their operating plan, SmartCells was never awash in cash like many VC-backed biotech 
start-ups.  This kept their salaries down, and forced them to make critical decisions based 
on the fact that they needed to keep demonstrating product-related risk reduction and 
value.  Their salaries were below the market value of VC-backed biotech start-ups; this 
policy helped align management expectations with those of the money-shareholders 
(SmartCells, 2016).  Having a relatively small rate of expenditure contributed to a 
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mutually beneficial relationship as SmartCells was not overburdened with excessive 
management salaries, and was able to maintain a lean corporate structure.  Many of the 
SmartCells employees, however, did not share their management’s views despite the 
management team’s attempts to explain the relative value.  SmartCells management 
believed this difference had to do with either their lack of start-up experience or their 
being involved in start-ups whose equity never amounted to anything (SmartCells, 2016).  
This made it very difficult to find and retain the right kind of employees.  SmartCells had 
seventeen employees when Merck bought it (the largest number in its history).  Yet, the 
company had over forty-five people pass through its payroll over the years.  Despite the 
employees’ lack of confidence in the value of their SmartCells’ equity stakes, most 
employees made at least four years their salary in a lump sum including bonus payments, 
stock option payments, and severance after the Merck acquisition (SmartCells, 2016). 
 
Technical 
 
The SmartInsulin development path relied on a combination of technical know-
how, data-driven decision-making, hard work and serendipity.  In fact, there were at least 
three critical moments during the six year development timeline that represented 
roadblocks to product performance and also presented opportunities to develop better, 
more robust embodiments of the technology. 
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Safety and Subcutaneous Efficacy 
The technology licensed from M.I.T. consisted of a glucose-binding molecule 
(GBM) which reversibly crosslinked a glucose-containing polymer to which insulin was 
covalently attached.  An illustration of the construct is shown in Figure 4.  The materials 
were hydrogels that demonstrated adjustable glucose-sensitivity in the physiological 
range and long-acting, glucose-responsive blood glucose control in diabetic rats 
following an intraperitoneal (i.p.) implantation.  Technical challenges posed included: 
development of a hydrogel that could be injected subcutaneously (s.c.) through a standard 
insulin syringe; a GBM that was safe for human use; and a polymer that would allow 
insulin s.c. absorption into the circulation system after a glucose challenge.  None of 
these technical challenges were particularly easy.  Most notably, the GBM from M.I.T. 
was based on the plant lectin, Concanavalin A (Con A), which was known to be 
immunogenic and mitogenic in mammals.  Furthermore, the dextran polymer was too big 
to pass through the s.c. barrier, but smaller polymers were not capable of crosslinking to 
form the hydrogel (Zion, 2004).   
 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of Con A and a glucose containing polymer interaction.  
Physiological free glucose displaces the glucose polymer to disrupt the Con A network. 
[glucose] 
Multivalent glucose 
binding molecule
Glucose‐containing 
polymer
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After approximately two years, the SmartCells team had developed a way to 
chemically modify the Con A to minimize its adverse safety issues.  They had also 
developed a glucose-containing polymer that was still large enough to form hydrogels but 
would break down through the action of enzymes into smaller components that could be 
absorbed from the s.c. layer after it was released in response to glucose.  The combined 
system could be injected s.c. through a syringe, and the resulting materials demonstrated 
superior glucose control in diabetic rats (SmartCells, 2016).  
   
Dealing with Disparity in Performance between Rodents and Large Animals  
Rodents are far from ideal models of human diabetes for many reasons, including 
their notorious resistance to the effects of insulin as well as the increased speed with 
which compounds can absorb from the s.c. layer.  Therefore, SmartCells obtained grant 
and equity financing in late 2006/early 2007, as shown in Figure 2, to evaluate their 
materials’ performance in the more translatable pig model.  A set-back was identified 
when the materials that worked perfectly well in the rodents caused massive 
hypoglycemia in pigs.  The source of the disparity was tracked down to differences 
between the rodents’ and pigs’ enzyme activity.  The enzymes that broke down the 
glucose-containing insulin polymer to enable s.c. absorption were “so much more active 
in pigs” (SmartCells, 2016).  The polymer was digested even before it was released by 
glucose from the hydrogel.  In essence, the feature that enabled s.c. performance in rats 
became a serious liability when it came to pigs.  Further in vitro studies demonstrated 
differences in enzyme activity across multiple species, including humans.  Therefore, the 
polymer degradability had to be tuned properly for each species of interest.  Given that 
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the FDA requires evaluation in a rodent and non-rodent animal model prior to testing in 
humans, the SmartCells team was faced with the daunting task of designing a system that 
i) was safe and effective in the two evaluation species despite species differences in 
enzyme activity and ii) had a reasonable chance of working in humans.  In the face of 
challenge, the SmartCells management team opted to forgo the enzyme-degradable 
system and design a new system that could still form hydrogels using glucose-containing 
molecules that were small enough to absorb from the s.c. layer.  In order to provide 
enough funding to accomplish this goal the company had to slash its workforce from 
twelve full-time employees down to five, put the CEO and CSO, Drs. Zion and 
Lancaster, respectively, back in the lab full-time, and require everyone to work six to 
seven days per week for more than fourteen hours per day.  This represented a major 
turning point in SmartCells’ history.  Many stakeholders look back at this as a “bump in 
the road,” but the management team knew the gravity of the situation and responded 
accordingly (SmartCells, 2016). 
 
New Sugar Chemistry and Serendipity 
After approximately nine months, the team emerged having developed specially 
designed, branched sugars that when conjugated to insulin could form hydrogels, but 
could also absorb quickly into circulation when released by glucose without requiring 
enzyme degradation.  SmartCells then rebuilt its GBM technology to be compatible with 
the newly designed sugar chemistry.  In late 2008, the company restarted discussions 
with potential partners offering up the new technology for consideration.  In addition, the 
company started recruiting additional employees to increase product development efforts.  
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During that time, Drs. Lancaster and Zion noticed deviations with the newer insulin-sugar 
conjugates that warranted further attention.  It appeared that some embodiments could 
perform in a glucose-responsive manner even without forming hydrogels with the GBM.  
After extensive investigation, the team discovered that there were certain GBMs (lectins) 
already present within the body that could bind and render inactive the insulin conjugates 
but release the materials at higher sugar concentrations.  This rather serendipitous 
discovery would render the exogenous GBM unnecessary and greatly simplify the safety, 
manufacturing, cost, and delivery of SmartInsulin.  Even though it was still risky to 
abandon the GBM, the SmartCells team decided to completely focus on this new 
discovery.  Furthermore, it was very difficult for the SmartCells management team to 
explain to the potential pharmaceutical partners that the product they were evaluating had 
been abandoned in favor of a newer but less proven embodiment.  Nevertheless, the team 
understood that this was the right move in the long run, and several of the big 
pharmaceutical companies, including Merck, decided to continue their due diligence and 
pursue a potential development partnership.  In fact, the new embodiment proved to be so 
appealing that Merck offered to acquire the technology in 2009 based solely on the rodent 
data.  Nevertheless, in mid-2009 another major turning point materialized (SmartCells, 
2016). 
 
Lack of Translation (the Sequel) and Final Push 
After the newest generation of the technology was proven in rodents, the team 
pushed aggressively toward pig studies.  Once again, however, the materials that 
performed well in rodents failed to translate to the higher-order mammals.  But in this 
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case, the team had identified a material that worked well in pigs and linked the lack of 
translatability to differences in insulin sensitivity.  These results came when Merck was 
ready to close an acquisition deal.  SmartCells made the ethical decision to disclose the 
lack of animal translatability to Merck which caused them to walk away leaving 
SmartCells and the deal in limbo.  Although the SmartCells team felt more confident 
about the commercial prospects of the technology, they needed to make sure that they 
chose the sugar chemistry that would best enable a human product.  Concerned that no 
animal model would tell the whole story, the team decided to design and raise money to 
perform a first-in-man clinical study.  From late 2009 to early 2010, the company raised 
almost as much money as they had over the previous five years ($4M+) to build out its 
own GMP manufacturing, quality control, and GLP assay laboratory; to prepare clinical 
grade material; to obtain regulatory approval for the exploratory clinical study; and to 
initiate the study.  Concurrently, the team applied for and received a $3M grant to support 
the clinical studies.  SmartCells was now ready to demonstrate that its materials could 
perform as advertised in humans.  However, the team made one last push to see if any 
pharmaceutical company was interested in partnering before they obtained the dispositive 
clinical data.  Merck and one other company decided that SmartCells’ technology was 
attractive enough to want to take over the program.  Paradoxically, the pending clinical 
study was a strong incentive to close a deal as soon as possible.  Both companies wanted 
to make sure that they could own and develop the technology as they saw fit and did not 
want SmartCells “rushing” into clinical studies to prove a point.  SmartCells steadfastly 
adhered to their November 2010 deadline to initiate clinical trials, and Merck was forced 
to move with a closeout bid (SmartCells, 2016).   
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The work of SmartCells to reach this point in the development of SmartInsulin 
resulted in over of twenty utility and/or design patents issued from the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  The list of patents held by SmartCells is 
presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: SmartCells' Patents. The development of SmartInsulin resulted in over twenty 
patents from the USPTO. 
Title of Patent Publication Number
Binding Site Modified Lectins and Uses Thereof US 20140342980 
Conjugate Based Systems for Controlled Insulin Delivery US 20140274888 
Uses of Macrophage Mannose Receptor to Screen Compounds 
and Uses of These Compounds US 20130302825 
Drug-Ligand Conjugates, Synthesis Thereof, and Intermediates 
Thereto US 20130131310 
Recombinant Lectins, Binding-Site Modified Lectins and Uses 
Thereof US 9068013 
Recombinantly Expressed Insulin Polypeptides and Uses Thereof US 9074015 
Drug-Ligand Conjugates, Synthesis Thereof, and Intermediates 
Thereto US 20130190475 
Polymer-Drug Conjugates US 20120135919 
Synthetic conjugates and uses thereof US 8940690 
Drug-ligand conjugates, synthesis thereof, and intermediates 
thereto US 8933207 
Crystalline insulin-conjugates US 8906850 
Exogenously triggered controlled release materials and uses 
thereof US 8846103 
Methods for reducing the mitogenicity of lectin compositions US 8729242 
Method for controllably releasing a drug conjugate within 
subcutaneous tissue in response to the local concentration of an 
indicator 
US 8697643 
Terminally-functionalized conjugates and uses thereof US 8623345 
Polynucleotide aptamer-based cross-linked materials and uses 
thereof US 8603529 
Soluble non-depot insulin conjugates and uses thereof US 8569231 
Stimuli-Responsive Systems for Controlled Drug Delivery US 8357400 
Stimuli-Responsive Systems for Controlled Drug Delivery US 8062668 
Methods for Reducing the Mitogenicity of Lectin Compositions US 7687608 
Stimuli-Responsive Systems for Controlled Drug Delivery US 7531191 
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Human Capital 
 
 Another key attribute that contributed to SmartCells’ success was their personnel.  
Team-building and human resource management are crucial to the success of any 
enterprise, but are more acutely critical to the success or failure of a start-up company.  
There is nowhere to hide in a start-up, and there is not enough time or money to suffer 
ineptitude or misalignment of work ethics.  In the early days, SmartCells was so cash-
constrained that everyone was wearing multiple hats to complete the work.  But as 
SmartCells continued to de-risk the R&D program, they could raise more and more 
money allowing them to make additional hires (SmartCells, 2016).  
    
Founding Management 
Dr. Zion, co-founder, CEO and president, was able to define and articulate the 
grand vision and tie all of the different company aspects (e.g. financing, investor 
relations, technical development, grant writing, public presentations, etc.) into one basis 
on which to make critical decisions.  Dr. Zion understood both the technical and business 
risks associated with bringing a start-up pharmaceutical company through to fruition.  In 
the early days of SmartCells, this helped tremendously, especially when fundraising.  
Prospective investors could “one-stop shop” for answers to their questions (SmartCells, 
2016). 
Dr. Lancaster, co-founder and Vice President of Research and Development, 
brought a sharp experimental mind with attention to scientific rigor.  He was able to 
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concentrate more on the science and technical aspects without having to immerse himself 
in the corporate governance.  He led the in-house R&D team that had rapidly developed 
and tested SmartInsulin formulations with a variety of performance profiles.  He was 
eager to learn as much as possible from the experimental failures (SmartCells, 2016). 
Mr. Herriman, co-founder and Vice President of Operations, brought hands-on 
start-up experience and a more seasoned perspective on the fundamentals of building and 
running a company.  He was able to focus on company finances, investor relations and 
daily operations without having to dig too deep into the science (SmartCells, 2016).      
 The management team members were aware of each other’s primary sphere of 
responsibility and willing to step in to help as needed.  SmartCells had a small, functional 
and focused management team who embodied the entrepreneurial spirit.  The co-founders 
of Zion, Lancaster and Herriman each possessed different complementary skill sets that 
worked well together.  This was especially important in the beginning as SmartCells 
could only afford a handful of employees.  The founding members were intellectually 
honest and focused on commercial success and were not afraid to ask for help when they 
needed it.  They were results-oriented and had an informal rule of “no office politics” 
(SmartCells, 2016).  This produced straightforward, frank and honest communication 
with success being based on investor return and not on raising capital or capturing 
headlines.  They had no pre-conceived notions about the outcomes of experiments, what 
the final product had to look like, or whether to run the company as a virtual company or 
perform everything in-house.  They were very open-minded and let the experimental data 
guide their decision making.  It should be noted that it is unusual for a founding 
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management team to stay intact throughout the entire life of the company (SmartCells, 
2016).  It is a testament to the quality of the team and its contribution to success.   
 
Key Employees 
As cohesive as the founding group was, they had little experience with hiring and 
firing employees, and as such, started hiring employees with a cautious optimism.  It was 
after just the first nine months that the founding management team realized that they 
would have to make hard decisions and start to fire team members who were not pulling 
their own weight.  Those who came to the company feeling entitled did not last very long.   
Subsequent employees were successful if they brought with them the idea that 
hard work and sacrifice up front could lead to outsized rewards in the long run.  
Employees that were most willing to work very hard, show initiative in the lab, and adapt 
to the ever-changing needs of the R&D organization held the most important qualities 
SmartCells was looking for.  SmartCells found that there was no easy way to screen for 
these employees in the interviewing process so they just had to “hire these applicants and 
try them out to see if they had the hands-on, hard-work ethic, and flexibility required to 
mesh with SmartCells’ needs” (SmartCells, 2016).  
 The optimism turned to cynicism, though, as most employees disagreed with the 
risk-reward proposition as discussed in the Financial section.  Perhaps it was the 
management team’s lack of experience in hiring or their unrealistically high expectations, 
but regardless of the cause, finding and retaining high quality employees was the bane of 
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SmartCells’ existence.  However, the rapport among Drs. Zion, Lancaster and Herriman 
kept the company going through these ups and downs (SmartCells, 2016). 
After the team downsized in 2007-2008 to develop its next generation technology, 
management was committed to rebuilding the team using the lessons they had learned 
over their previous four years.  As was the case on many occasions, a little luck was 
involved.  The company from whom SmartCells had been subleasing space had to 
downsize dramatically at the same time SmartCells was looking to grow.  Having 
developed collaborative working relationships already with key employees from the 
landlord company, it was easy to hire them after they were laid off.  In addition, research 
groups at M.I.T. and Harvard were specifically targeted to find high functioning, 
ambitious, newly minted Ph.D. graduates.  SmartCells offered to pay these new recruits 
higher than market value to make it worth their while.  Lastly, SmartCells found key 
employees who were caught in the economic downturn of 2009 who may have otherwise 
been unavailable to a small cash-strapped start-up company.  SmartCells did retain some 
key hires before the downsizing who performed the day-to-day work with the animal 
studies.  The animal study work was critically important to the company’s success  
(SmartCells, 2016). 
As mentioned above, there were seventeen employees at SmartCells when the 
company was sold to Merck in 2010, the most the company had ever employed at one 
time.  Based on interviews with key SmartCells employees, there was a general 
consensus that the team was the most productive and high functioning of any past group; 
the best team was “left on the field” at the end (SmartCells, 2016). 
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Advisors and Board Members 
In addition to the management team and key recruits, SmartCells had additional 
support and collaborators from M.I.T., Massachusetts General Hospital, Joslin Diabetes 
Center, JDRF, NIH, former biotech executives, and industry experts.  Among these 
collaborators was Dr. Alan Watson, who served as Vice President of SmartCells Business 
Development.  Dr. Watson was formerly the Chief Business Officer at Elixir 
Pharmaceuticals Incorporated and Senior Vice President of Corporate Development at 
Cubist Pharmaceuticals Incorporated (Akston Biosciences, 2017). 
A few notable Scientific Board members included Dr. Jens Brange, who is one of 
the foremost experts on insulin pharmaceutical development, and Dr. S. Edwin Fineberg, 
the leading authority on measuring insulin antibodies.  SmartCells Medical Advisory 
Board included Dr. Gordon Weir, Dr. Howard Wolpert, Dr. Enrico Cagliero and Dr. 
Lloyd Axelrod who are authorities on islet function, insulin pump development and 
clinical diabetes research (Bloomberg, 2017).   
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Chapter IV 
Discussion 
 
SmartCells was not your typical biotechnology company.  It is truly remarkable 
that such a short-funded biotechnology company was able to reduce product risk to the 
point of achieving one of the largest pre-clinical life-science deals ever.  Among the 
numerous elements throughout this paper that enabled SmartCells to be successful, there 
are three main points that aspiring entrepreneurs and investors need to understand before 
attempting to adopt the “SmartCells model”: i) having access to non-dilutive capital, ii) a 
disease application for which the risk could be significantly reduced in pre-clinical 
studies or very early clinical studies, and iii) a team that is capable of shifting directions 
or reinventing itself.  These areas are at the heart of this successful venture. 
    SmartCells’ success did not evolve overnight.  It took time to develop the right 
business model to take advantage of this opportunity.  SmartCells adopted a method of 
success by raising relatively small amounts of money from angel investors and grants and 
deploying the capital in such a way that would create incremental value as they deployed 
each tranche of resources.   
As the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
(IFPMA) point out in their 2004 paper published on the World Health Organization’s 
website, “Risk is a fundamental element in pharmaceutical R&D”.  The IFPMA paper 
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further established that bringing an idea to fruition is highly reliant on reducing the time 
and costs associated with regulatory approval (World Health Organization, 2004).  With 
this in mind, SmartCells had to minimize the project’s risk to the point that a large 
pharmaceutical company would partner with them or acquire the asset outright.  The plan 
was by no means free of risk.  For example, it was difficult to determine if and how much 
a pharmaceutical company would pay SmartCells before they could no longer resource 
the development efforts.  It was for this reason that SmartCells had concrete engagement 
with possible pharmaceutical partners early on - so that they would know the companies’ 
concerns and address them as soon as possible. 
  A company, at some point, needs to be able to obtain a term sheet from at least 
one pharmaceutical partner before the company tries to raise too many resources.  A 
company can always reject a pharmaceutical partner's terms as being unfavorable and 
decide to move forward at-risk on its own, but a company that receives no term sheets 
before it mounts a clinical effort is destined to fail with the SmartCells business model.  
A lack of interest is likely to persist even after the company raises and spends a lot more 
money.  Simply put, if there is no assurance that the company can achieve an exit after its 
planned clinical study, the company might be without a chance for a successful 
pharmaceutical deal. 
SmartCells had deal terms from multiple pharmaceutical companies two years 
before it sold to Merck.  The deal terms were not overly favorable, but having these terms 
in hand signaled to SmartCells that their biggest risk shifted from running out of money 
to having to settle for a less than optimal deal (SmartCells, 2016). 
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Angel Investors and Access to Non-Dilutive Funding 
 
When SmartCells was raising money from angel investors, there was no 
integrated network for angel investors to share information regarding business 
opportunities (Sohl, 2004).  The absence of this network could be because there were far 
fewer life-science angel investors present when SmartCells was raising money than there 
are today.  This required SmartCells to go out and “tell the story” and engage in diligence 
many times over.  Presently, information sharing and diligence is more syndicated among 
the angel investors.  This means that if one group likes a deal, a company is likely to get a 
lot more money flowing in passively from the other groups based on the 
recommendation.  The opposite is also true – if a company makes a mistake with one 
group it may be difficult to gain traction with the others (SmartCells, 2016). 
As stated earlier in the Finance section, SmartCells ended up having about 150 
investors.  Success does breed success as it was very difficult for SmartCells to raise 
money in the early days, but as they made progress and obtained additional grant funding, 
those investors and new investors decided to participate.  This helped them expand the 
investor base and raise money more easily.  The investment amount per investor varied 
from a few thousand dollars to about $1M (SmartCells, 2016).  None of the investors 
contributed any significant expertise to the company and it was diffuse enough that they 
had little influence on the company.  Companies relying on VC’s investment risk VC’s 
implementation of their own management as seen in Table 1.  Having many individual 
investors rather than a few institutional ones gave the management team the ability to set 
the course for the company.  A large pool of investors provides stability in that if some 
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investors did not continue to invest there were always others.  However, the large pool of 
individual investors did make it difficult to get the required signatures to approve the deal 
with Merck (SmartCells, 2016).   
Grants played a major role in funding and, according to the SmartCells’ 
management team, SmartCells would likely have failed without grant support.  
SmartCells raised almost $10M from angel investors, which is “pushing the limit of angel 
investing” (SmartCells, 2016), and required the same amount from grants to succeed.  
Raising $20M from just angel investors would have been close to impossible for 
SmartCells (SmartCells, 2016).  Aside from the financial support, grants provided 
validation of the merit of the technology and approach. The grant processes are highly 
competitive, and the total amount of grant money is limited.  By convincing agencies to 
continue granting money to SmartCells, it was possible to signal to investors, prospective 
investors and to prospective pharmaceutical partners that SmartCells had technology 
worth their investment.  The process of writing grants, especially SBIRs, allows for the 
company to hone its message, periodically take stock of its technical progress, and 
critically analyze the next logical steps of risk reduction.  Additionally, maintaining 
grants instills a strict culture of financial stewardship and accounting that translates 
through the rest of the facets of the company.  
Although obtaining grant money is looked upon favorably, the downside is the 
timing and restriction on the use of funds.  Grants typically do not pay for brick and 
mortar expenses (e.g. rent, lawyer costs, patent costs, equipment, administrative 
personnel, etc.) (National Science Foundation, 2017).  Even for good applications, a 
company might have to wait up to a year after submission to receive initial funds due to 
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budgetary restrictions or programmatic prioritization issues.  This makes it very difficult 
to plan and budget for activities.  Additionally, grants aren’t purely non-dilutive.  The 
government has “march-in” rights to the IP if necessary.  The government only intervenes 
in cases where “there is a threat to public safety”, so it is a low, but not zero, risk 
(National Institutes of Health, 2013).   
A major risk was that SmartCells’ funding did not leave a lot of room for error. 
The reward, though, was the ability to hold on to a comparatively larger portion of the 
upside if they were successful than if they had raised more money from VCs in the 
beginning.  This was one of the major achievements that may have been unknown or 
underappreciated about SmartCells - just how little of a financial safety net with which 
they operated while funding their operations. 
 
Disease Application Risk Reduction 
 
The cost of developing new drugs increases significantly as a possible therapy 
proceeds from pre-clinical to early clinical to late stage clinical studies, as shown in 
Figure 1.  SmartCells had to raise almost as much money in its last year than in its 
previous five years just to mount one early stage clinical trial (Figure 2).  SmartCells still 
needed a $3M grant from NIH to maintain stability.  The next clinical trial would have 
cost upwards of $25M thereby rendering continued angel financing impossible 
(SmartCells, 2016).  If an entrepreneur cannot show a concrete value proposition and risk 
reduction endpoint that can be practically achieved with just angel and grant money, there 
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is little reason to raise angel money in the first place.  Treating diabetes and 
demonstrating improved glycemic control fits this category well, but this is not 
necessarily true for many other fields.  One exception is the field of orphan diseases for 
which no therapy exists, where clinical trials generally involve small numbers, and the 
risk-reward equation is highly in favor of the new drug.   
The diabetes space is unique in this aspect in that animal models are usually more 
predictive of what will happen in the clinic (Al-awar et al., 2016; King, 2012).  Glucose 
control in diabetes is an example of a case where one may not be able to remove all of the 
risks of clinical success, but one can significantly decrease the risk by executing targeted 
studies in rodents, pigs and dogs.  Furthermore, the timelines required to determine 
improved glycemic control are measured in days and weeks for acute control and just 
months for long term effects (HbA1c levels) (Saudek & Brick, 2009).  Even more 
importantly, the link between HbA1c and long-term outcomes (e.g. retinopathy, 
neuropathy, nephropathy, and microvascular complications) has been established by the 
landmark studies of The Diabetes Control and Complications Trial (DCCT) and U.K. 
Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS).  The DCCT and UKPDS studies have both 
convincingly demonstrated that better blood glucose control significantly reduces the 
development of complications in patients with diabetes.  This established link is accepted 
by clinicians, pharmaceutical developers, and regulatory agencies as a meaningful 
biomarker for clinical benefits (American Diabetes Association, 2002). 
In contrast, cancer, Alzheimer's disease, anti-infectives, and cardio-vascular 
disease are areas in which there is intense competition, lack of translation from pre-
clinical models, little chance to prove efficacy with small clinical trials and requirements 
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for long, involved studies to determine the benefits to patients (Franco & Cedazo-
Minguez, 2014; Mak, Evaniew, & Ghert, 2014).  It would be very difficult to build a 
company in these areas using the “SmartCells model.”    
For non-technical stakeholders (e.g. certain investors and board members) it can 
be very difficult to accept the need to fundamentally change the underlying technology to 
make the ultimate product more likely to succeed in the future, as SmartCells had to do in 
2008 when they retooled the formulation.  The financial stakeholders’ investment thesis 
relies, however naively, on the idea that they are betting on a technology and that the 
people advancing the technology are potentially replaceable, if necessary.  However, the 
more experienced investor bets on the people who can shape the technology to achieve 
the best outcomes.  Fortunately, SmartCells had enough people in the right places who 
held the latter to be true as opposed to the former.  Such a mindset is critical for early-
stage technology ventures. 
 
Dynamic Leadership 
 
One of the most important aspects of any venture is the team and management.   
This is especially true in that it takes a lot of time to build a team that can work well 
together in the high stress, high expectation and highly uncertain environment of a 
company like SmartCells.  In other words, it takes time to develop a team that is capable 
of shifting directions or reinventing itself if the situation calls for it.  VC-backed 
companies with more funding can afford to hire more people than are needed and can 
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perhaps better endure inefficiencies.  Angel-backed companies may run out of time or 
money before they can build the right team.  Fortuitously, SmartCells survived long 
enough to get to where they needed to be.  Companies choosing to adopt the “SmartCells 
model” should not underestimate the human resource challenges presented by a 
minimally funded, high risk technology venture.  Additionally, if the management team 
does not have the boldness to eliminate employees at the first signs of distress, then the 
“boot strap” financing model is not for them (SmartCells, 2016). 
In 2007-2008 when the formulation needed to be rebooted, management had to 
reduce the number of employees from twelve employees to five in order to retool the 
technology while conserving capital.  Subsequently, SmartCells was careful in bringing 
on staff as they had gone through the experience on having to downsize when they had 
some scientific setbacks.  More people did not necessarily mean things went better or 
faster.  Of the seventeen employees that worked for SmartCells at the time of the Merck 
acquisition, approximately ten were hired within the previous year.  Almost all of them 
were involved in laboratory work as SmartCells increased productivity heading toward 
clinical trials.  The best recruits came toward the end of SmartCells lifetime and were 
responsible for manufacturing, assay development, and basic mechanism of action 
studies.  SmartCells needed to pay them at or above market salary to entice them to come 
aboard.  At that time, SmartCells had raised enough money do so.  It was only then that 
SmartCells was able to field a team that had no holes (SmartCells, 2016). 
SmartCells developed multiple versions of its technology over the years due to 
critical failures with each successive version.  Most teams do not have the insight or 
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courage to recognize the need for change, advocate for the change, and convince less 
flexible stakeholders of the need (SmartCells, 2016).  
Some management teams are capable of making changes, but they surround 
themselves with stakeholders who either don't understand the need or are inherently 
resistant to radical changes.  As discussed above, when raising money from a large 
number of individual investors, one increases the odds that any one vocally discontent 
stakeholder actively resists the necessary changes required to position the company for 
success.  A new enterprise has to be careful to make sure investors understand just what 
they are getting into when they make their investments.  A good management team needs 
to be headstrong in these instances and do what is ultimately ethically and legally right. 
Teams that lack deep experience with and knowledge of the technology in their 
leadership are destined to fail with the “SmartCells model.”  The leaders will rely on 
technical employees, who may not be as committed, to recommend the right kind of 
directional changes (SmartCells, 2016).  The leaders will not have a technically critical 
eye for figuring these things out on their own.  This is unequivocally one of the key 
strengths of SmartCells.  Not only did their management team have good business 
acumen, but they were scrupulous and reputable scientists who understood the underlying 
technology.  
 If an entrepreneur can find a pharmaceutical space that allows their venture to 
reduce technical risk early and a conscientious management team that religiously adheres 
to capital efficiency as described in this case study, then the “SmartCells model” will be 
advantageous.     
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Future of SmartInsulin 
  
Merck has subsequently renamed SmartInsulin to MK-2640, and its lead 
candidate just completed a Phase 1 trial as this thesis is being drafted.  Using healthy and 
diabetic participants, the trial gathered data on the safety and tolerability of intravenous 
doses while obtaining preliminary plasma pharmacokinetic profiles (Levy, 2015).  The 
SmartCells management team has subsequently parlayed their success into another start-
up venture named Akston Biosciences Corporation (Akston Biosciences, 2017).  
 
 
  
 
 
44 
 
 
References 
 
 
 
 
Akston Biosciences. (2017). Akston Biosciences.   Retrieved from 
http://www.akstonbio.com/ 
 
Al-awar, A., Kupai, K., Veszelka, M., #xe9, dea, Sz, . . . Varga, C. (2016). Experimental 
Diabetes Mellitus in Different Animal Models. Journal of Diabetes Research, 
2016, 12. doi:10.1155/2016/9051426 
 
American Diabetes Association. (2002). Implications of the United Kingdom Prospective 
Diabetes Study. Diabetes Care, 25(suppl 1), s28-s32. 
doi:10.2337/diacare.25.2007.S28 
 
American Diabetes Association. (2017). Statistics about Diabetes.   Retrieved from 
http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-basics/statistics/ 
 
Balakrishnan, A. (2015). Biotech investing trends may be hurting innovation.   Retrieved 
from http://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/13/biotech-investing-trends-may-be-hurting-
innovation.html 
 
Bloomberg. (2017). Company Overview of SmartCells, Inc.   Retrieved from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/board.asp?privcapId=122212
61 
 
Booth, B. (2011). SmartCells, Smart Story: Lean Biotech, Large Return.  Retrieved from 
https://lifescivc.com/2011/06/smartcells-smart-story-lean-biotech-large-return/ 
 
Carroll, J. (2010). Merck ($MRK) to buy SmartCells in $500M deal Fierce Biotech. 
  
Cryer, P. E. (2008). The Barrier of Hypoglycemia in Diabetes. Diabetes, 57(12), 3169-
3176. doi:10.2337/db08-1084 
 
Franco, R., & Cedazo-Minguez, A. (2014). Successful therapies for Alzheimer’s disease: 
why so many in animal models and none in humans? Frontiers in Pharmacology, 
5, 146. doi:10.3389/fphar.2014.00146 
 
Frechette, R. (2013). No Lab? No Problem! Leveraging the Power of the Biotech 
Incubator for Startup Success Retrieved from 
http://blog.upstartlifesci.com/tag/smart-cells/ 
 
 
 
45 
 
Giniatullina, A., Boorsman, M., Mulder, G.-J., & van Deventer, S. (2013). Building for 
Big Pharma. Bioentrepreneur. doi:10.1038/bioe.2013.3 
 
Hovelmann, U. (2015). What are glucose clamps and why do we need them?  Retrieved 
from http://blog.profil.com/blog/what-are-glucose-clamps-and-why-do-we-need-
them 
 
Huckman, R. S., & Strick, E. (2010). GlaxoSmithKline: Reorganizing Drug Discovery 
(A). Harvard Business School, 605-074.  
 
International Diabetes Federation. (2017). IDF Diabetes Atlas.  Retrieved from 
http://www.idf.org/sites/default/files/Atlas7e-poster.pdf 
 
King, A. J. F. (2012). The use of animal models in diabetes research. British Journal of 
Pharmacology, 166(3), 877-894. doi:10.1111/j.1476-5381.2012.01911.x 
 
Levy, J. (2015). SmartInsulin (MK-2640) Starts Clinical Trials - Josh Levy's Post. 
  
Mak, I. W. Y., Evaniew, N., & Ghert, M. (2014). Lost in translation: animal models and 
clinical trials in cancer treatment. American Journal of Translational Research, 
6(2), 114-118. 
  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2003). SmartCells wins MIT $50K 
Entrepreneurship Competition. Retrieved from http://news.mit.edu/2003/50k 
 
Matheson, R. (2013). The half-billion-dollar idea.   Retrieved from 
http://news.mit.edu/2013/todd-zion-smartcells-0408 
 
McBride, R. (2010). SmartCells CEO Reflects on Strategy Leading to $500M Exit with 
Merck. Xconomy. 
  
Mervis, J. (2015). Business Decisions. Science, 348(6240), 1190-1193. 
doi:10.1126/science.348.6240.1190 
 
MIT Venture Mentoring Service. (2015). MIT Venture Mentoring Service, About.   
Retrieved from http://vms.mit.edu/about 
 
National Academies of Sciences, E., & Medicine. (2015). SBIR at the National Science 
Foundation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
 
National Institutes of Health. (2013). Bayh-Doyle Regulations.   Retrieved from 
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/bayh-dole.htm#401.14 
 
National Institutes of Health. (2017). SBIR/STTR About.   Retrieved from 
https://sbir.nih.gov/about 
 
 
 
46 
 
National Science Foundation. (2017). Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) for SBIR-
STTR.   Retrieved from https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2017/nsf17029/nsf17029.jsp 
 
Pan, H. (2005). Recent Consolidations, Acquisitions & IPOs in the Satellite Industry. 
Brighton, MA: Information Gatekeepers Inc. 
 
Partners in BioPharma Consulting. (2014). Real Solutions - Measured Results.   
Retrieved from http://partnersinbpc.com/14_june_nl.php 
 
Rockoff, J. D. (2010). Merck to Buy Biotech Company Developing Diabetes Drug. The 
Wall Street Journal.  
 
Saudek, C. D., & Brick, J. C. (2009). The Clinical Use of Hemoglobin A1c. Journal of 
diabetes science and technology (Online), 3(4), 629-634.  
 
SmartCells (2016). [Interviews with high level SmartCells team members]. 
 
Sohl, J. (2004). The importance of angels in starting a US biotech venture. 
Bioentrepreneur. doi:10.1038/bioent839 
 
Thau, S. B., & Delcheva, A. V. (2012). United States: Introducing the BioMeter.   
Retrieved from 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/212378/Life+Sciences+Biotechnology/Int
roducing+the+BioMeter 
 
Van Norman, G. A. (2016). Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 1: An Overview of 
Approval Processes for Drugs. JACC: Basic to Translational Science, 1(3), 170-
179. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacbts.2016.03.002 
 
World Health Organization. (2004). International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufactures and Associations.   Retrieved from 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/Pharmaceutical_innovation.pdf 
 
Zion, T. C. (2004). Glucose-responsive materials for self-regulated insulin delivery. (Ph. 
D.), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Retrieved from 
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28359  
 
